Seizing the “Organic” Moment: Cuba’s Agricultural Crossroads and Certified Organic Export Potential by Hevia, Wesley J. et al.
Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 29 | Issue 1 Article 39
2017
Seizing the “Organic” Moment: Cuba’s Agricultural






William A. Messina Jr.
University of Florida
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact averyle@law.ufl.edu,
kaleita@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hevia, Wesley J.; Olexa, Michael T.; Ankersen, Thomas T.; and Messina, William A. Jr. (2017) "Seizing the “Organic” Moment: Cuba’s
Agricultural Crossroads and Certified Organic Export Potential," Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 29 : Iss. 1 , Article 39.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol29/iss1/39
303 
SEIZING THE “ORGANIC” MOMENT: CUBA’S 
AGRICULTURAL CROSSROADS AND CERTIFIED 
ORGANIC EXPORT POTENTIAL* 
 
Wesley J. Hevia, Michael T. Olexa, Thomas T. Ankersen, & 
William A. Messina, Jr. ** 
 
Cuba has been referred to as “the world's first national experiment in 
sustainable agriculture.” Given the critical shortages in chemical inputs 
to Cuba’s agricultural sector following the loss of Soviet economic 
support and subsidization, this may well be a fitting description. Cuba’s 
use of the term “organic” to describe some of its agricultural production 
can be misleading. Not all of Cuba’s “organic” products would satisfy the 
organic certification requirements for most developed countries. That 
being said, Cuba is shipping certified organic fresh citrus and citrus juices 
into EU markets. With proper investments and implementation of the 
appropriate procedures and protocols, Cuba could well establish itself as 
a global supplier of organic products.1 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 304 
 
II.   THE REGIONAL CONTEXT: THE CASE OF THE  
  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ................................................................ 307 
 
III.  CUBA’S REGULATORY STRENGTHS ............................................. 310 
 A.  Cuban Foreign Investment Law 118/2014 ........................... 311 
 B.  Mariel Special Development Zone ....................................... 312 
                                                                                                                     
*   This Article is being reprinted with permission from the authors and Drake Journal of 
Agricultural Law. The correct citation for this Article is as follows: Wesley J. Hevia et al., Seizing 
the “Organic” Moment: Cuba’s Agricultural Crossroads and Certified Organic Export Potential, 
21 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297-324 (2016). 
**   Wesley J. Hevia is an attorney at Akerman LLP, where he focuses his practice on land 
use and real estate matters. He also contributes on select matters within the firm’s Cuba Practice 
Group. Wesley completed his postgraduate degrees at the University of Florida, where he earned 
a Juris Doctor, Master of Science in Real Estate, and Certificate in Environmental and Land Use 
Law. This paper originates, in part, from his work with the Levin College of Law’s Conservation 
Clinic. Michael T. Olexa, is a Professor and Director of the University of Florida/Institute of Food 
and Agricultural Sciences (UF/IFAS) Center for Agricultural and Natural Resource Law and 
Chairs the Agricultural Law Committee of the Florida Bar. Through the UF Levin College of 
Law, he has worked in sustainable agriculture in several Latin American Countries. Thomas T. 
Ankersen is a Legal Skills Professor at the UF Levin College of Law. He directs the College’s 
Conservation Clinic, and its Costa Rica Program Sustainable Development: Law, Policy and 
Professional Practice. He has worked extensively throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. 
William A. Messina, Jr. is an Agricultural Economist in the Department of Food and Resource 
Economics UF/IFAS and has traveled and worked with Cuban Agriculturalists for the past thirty 
years. 
 1.  OFFICE OF GLOB. ANALYSIS ET AL., CUBA’S FOOD & AGRICULTURE SITUATION REPORT 
33 (2008), https://www.ilfb.org/media/546435/fas reporton_cuba.pdf. 
1
Hevia et al.: Seizing the “Organic” Moment
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
304 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29 
 
 C.  National Organics Standards .............................................. 313 
 D.  Available Land Fit for Agricultural Use .............................. 315 
 E.  Farming Incentives & Organizations .................................. 316 
  1. Direct Incentives .............................................................. 319 
  2. Surplus Incentives ............................................................ 320 
  3. Land Grant Incentives ...................................................... 322 
 F.  Existing Certified Organic Operations ................................ 323 
 
IV.  POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ........................................................... 324 
 A.  Balancing Food Security with Exportation .......................... 325 
 B.  Biological Feasibility ........................................................... 325 
 C.  Environmental Risks ............................................................ 325 
  1. Hurricanes ........................................................................ 325 
  2. Pests & Disease ................................................................ 325 
  3. Quality Control ................................................................ 326 
 
V.   CRAFTING A CUBAN CERTIFIED ORGANIC PILOT PROGRAM ....... 326 
 A.  Objectives ............................................................................. 327 
 B.  Location ............................................................................... 327 
 C.  Participants .......................................................................... 328 
 D.  Incentives ............................................................................. 328 
 E.  Products ............................................................................... 328 
 F.  Certification ......................................................................... 329 
 




“Following the collapse of trade with the former Soviet bloc in 1990, 
[Cuban] imports of pesticides and fertilizers dropped 
[dramatically]. . . .”2 The disappearance of these farming inputs severely 
diminished nationwide crop yields and thus, placed Cuba’s agricultural 
production in a dire state.3 In response, Cuban agricultural agencies 
implemented far-reaching initiatives to promote low input, “organic,” 
agricultural systems throughout the country.4 According to a United 
                                                                                                                     
 2.  Rend Vossenaar & Amy Angel, Organic Agriculture: Experiences of Central America, 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic, in TRADE & ENVTL. REV. 2006, at 225, 233 (United Nations, 
2006). 
 3.  See id. 
 4.  Id. (stating “[k]ey elements included the promotion of organic agriculture and forestry 
in vacant municipal, State and private lands, recycling of all ‘green waste’ material into compost, 
and the creation of a variety of markets for local produce. Two basic innovations have been the 
adoption of (i) agro-ecological techniques in the countryside, and (ii) organically-based urban 
agriculture. Cuba’s agricultural transformation has included the substitution of imports by 
technology. According to Koont (2004), ‘Cuba has become a gigantic laboratory for farming 
2
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Nations report, this transformation of Cuban agriculture in the 1990s may 
have been “the most widespread conversion to organic agriculture” in 
history.5 
While Cuba’s “organic” farming initiatives demonstrate profound 
creativity and resourcefulness in addressing serious systemic problems, 
there has been no food production panacea. Indeed, Cuba’s food 
insecurity persists, resulting in a heavy reliance on imported food to feed 
the population.6 The Cuban government has long struggled to address this 
imbalance, but progress has been severely hampered by, among other 
things, a basic lack of capital resources.7 
Cuba has made a number of policy adjustments over the past few 
decade in an effort to address the basic economic problems that underlie 
its food security concerns.8 A recent and potentially important expression 
of these efforts comes in the form of Cuba’s new foreign investment law, 
referred to as Law 118,9 which addresses “Cuba’s need to provide greater 
incentives to attract foreign capital, new technologies, and know-how to 
increase domestic production and better position Cuba to export to 
international markets.”10 Cuba has actually allowed and in some cases, 
actively sought, foreign investment as far back as the 1990s.11 Law No. 
118 represents another effort to stimulate foreign investments into 
government-approved sectors, and agriculture is one such sector.12 
                                                                                                                     
without petroleum and petroleum derivatives. From pest control to fertilization and soil 
preparation, chemistry is out and biology is in.’ The Crop Protection Institute operates over 220 
centres that provide cheap and plentiful beneficial insects and micro-organisms that attack plant 
pests. Hundreds of centres produce one million tons of natural compost per year to improve poor 
quality urban and rural soil. The Ministry of Agriculture has been supporting this process with a 
network of extension agencies and supply stores.”). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Cuba: Current Issues and What the World Food Programme is Doing, WORLD 
FOOD PROGRAMME, https://www.wfp.org/countries/cuba (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (stating 
“Cuba imports 70 to 80 percent of its domestic food requirements . . .”). But see Miguel A. Altieri 
& Fernando R. Funes-Monzote, The Paradox of Cuban Agriculture, MONTHLY REV., Jan. 2012, 
at 23, 25 (indicating that there is apparently some controversy surrounding Cuban food import 
statistics because “[o]verall data show that Cuba’s food import dependency has been dropping for 
decades, despite brief upturns due to natural and human-made disasters.”). 
 7.  See Cuba: Current Issues and What the World Food Programme is Doing, supra 
note 6. 
 8.  See Altieri & Funes-Monzole, supra note 6, at 23. 
 9.  See Foreign Investment Act (Law No.118/2014) (Cuba). 
 10.  Luis M. Alcalde, Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law, KEGLER BROWN HILL RITTER 
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.keglerbrown.com/publications/cubas-new-foreigninvestment-law/. 
 11.  See, e.g., MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE & INV., PORTFOLIO OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 11 (2015), http://www.granma.cu/file/sp/cartera-de-oportunidades-de-
inversion-extranjera-23/datos/documentos/Portfolio%20of/o20Opportunities%20for/o20Foreign 
%20Investment%20205.pdf. 
 12.  Id. at 13. 
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Indeed, relations between the United States and Cuba have 
significantly changed over the past twenty months. On December 17, 
2014, Cuban President Raul Castro and U.S. President Barrack Obama 
simultaneously announced that negotiations would begin for restoration 
of diplomatic relations.13 On July 20, 2015, the United States and Cuba 
reopened embassies in each other’s capitals for the first time since 1961.14 
On March 22, 2015, President Obama—while accompanied by several 
prominent American business leaders and government officials—made 
what was essentially an unprecedented visit to Cuba, becoming the first 
sitting U.S. President to visit Cuba in nearly ninety years.15 The recent 
diplomatic engagement between the United States and Cuba is certainly 
noteworthy,16 and several U.S. firms have recently received authorization 
from the U.S. government to enter into joint venture business 
relationships in Cuba. Yet, the U.S. embargo restricting full and open 
trade with Cuba is an Act of Congress (Helms-Burton legislation, 1996) 
and as such, it can only be modified by Congress. Despite the recent 
diplomatic thaw, there is still no clear end to the embargo in sight.17 
As Cuba continues to open its economy to foreign investment and 
trade—and, relatedly, as relations with the United States continue to 
evolve—Cuba may see an influx of capital and resources. Cuba will 
almost certainly continue to try to address its food security concerns, and 
an increase in foreign investment in the agricultural sector would be 
expected to have a positive impact. However, such investment could 
mean returning, at least in part, to a traditional high input, high yield, 
commercial agricultural model. 
Therefore, Cuba may soon be at an “agricultural crossroad.” Cuba 
will need to decide whether, and to what extent, it wishes to maintain its 
present organic agricultural identity. That decision will most likely 
involve balancing two key interests. On one hand, Cuba would like to 
remain a world leader in, and continue to benefit from, environmentally 
friendly agricultural practices. On the other hand, Cuba would like to 
                                                                                                                     
 13.  Timeline: U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/cuba/ 
timeline-us-cuba-relations/p32817 (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Donna Tam & Sarah Menendez, Who Were the Executives Hanging out with Obama 
in Cuba?, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 22, 2016, 6:01 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/201 
6/03/22/world/who-are-us-business-leaders-hanging-outobama-cuba. 
 16.  Charting a New Course on Cuba, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba, (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 17.  Kevin Liptak, Obama Tells Raul Castro: Cuban Embargo is Going to End, CNN: 
POLITICS (Mar. 21, 2016, 5:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/21/politics/obama-cubanraul-
castro/ (On his trip to Cuba, President Obama also proclaimed that the embargo was going to end 
but gave no timetable.). 
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better satisfy the nutritional needs of its people without having to rely in 
large part on food supplies from other nations. There are surely 
compelling arguments on both sides, including whether these are 
mutually exclusive. This article, however, is premised upon the notion 
that Cuba should, at least to a significant extent, maintain its organic 
farming practices. While the European markets alone can probably 
support Cuba’s certified organic export potential, the United States 
represents a major additional market opportunity for Cuban certified 
organic products if and when the embargo might be lifted. Establishing a 
certified organic export sector now will position Cuba to respond to the 
rapidly growing American market for organic products once the 
opportunity becomes available. 
If Cuba is able to attract foreign capital, and ultimately create a 
certified organic export sector, it would be, in effect, committing to long-
term environmentally sustainable farming practices while at the same 
time bringing capital into its agricultural sector. If planned correctly, that 
capital could be reinvested to incentivize a net increase in internal 
agricultural production. This would be a favorable result for Cuba’s 
economy, its food security and environmental future, and the individual 
lives of Cuban farmers, alike. 
 
II. THE REGIONAL CONTEXT: THE CASE OF THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
Several countries in the greater Latin American and Caribbean 
Region have robust organic export markets.18 Foremost among these are 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic.19 Of these, arguably, 
none is more relevant to Cuba than the Dominican Republic, which sits 
less than 170 miles from the eastern edge of Cuba on the neighboring 
Caribbean island of Hispaniola.20 The two countries share a number of 
characteristics, including many of those relevant to agricultural 
production. Further, the two countries share a similar recent history of 
“de facto organic” farming as a response to difficult economic 
situations.21 
                                                                                                                     
 18.  See Salvador V. Garibay & Roberto Ugas, Organic Farming in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, in THE WORLD OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE - STATISTICS AND EMERGING TRENDS 2009, 
at 176, 179 (Willer, Helga & Lukas Kilchen eds., 2009). 
 19.  Id. at 179-80. 
 20.  GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (follow 
“directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Cuba” and search destination field for 
“Dominican Republic”; right click and select “measure distance”). 
 21.  Laura T. Raynolds, The Organic Agro-Export Boom in the Dominican Republic: 
Maintaining Tradition or Fostering Transformation?, 43 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 161, 166, 175 
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Despite operating with less than one quarter of Cuba’s arable land,22 
relative to its size, the Dominican Republic maintains more acreage in 
permanent crops than Cuba.23 Further, “the Dominican Republic has 
emerged as one of the world’s foremost exporters of organic bananas and 
cocoa, a top exporter of organic coffee, and an export pioneer in new 
commodities like organic mangos.”24 The Dominican organic export 
sector has had positive economic impacts on the Dominican Republic at 
large, as well as on thousands of individual farmers. But developing the 
Dominican organic export sector was not a simple task. 
“Dominican organic agriculture has historically been dominated by 
small-scale growers.”25 Unifying these farmers to meet the requisite 
collective economies of scale, and developing methods to ensure that 
production would meet international certification standards was a 
complicated process. Early support came from small, progressive 
development groups and nongovernmental organizations that were 
generally most interested in improving yields for local consumption. In 
more recent decades, however, the United Nations, multilateral donors, 
foreign government agencies, and expert companies “have provided 
substantial financial and technical assistance for Dominican organic 
export production, certification, and marketing.”26 
On the farmer side, numerous associations and cooperatives have 
emerged.27 “These vary in size from a few individual farmers to several 
                                                                                                                     
(2008) (“While agricultural modernization was heavily promoted [in the Dominican Republic] in 
the 1960s in a few irrigated regions of the country, greatly increasing chemical use among some 
producers, many peasants have been too poor to purchase large quantities of agrochemicals . . . . 
The central features of what is now called organic agriculture-the reliance on natural methods of 
enhancing soil fertility and resisting disease and the rejection of synthetic chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, and pharmaceuticals-have thus been historically maintained in the Dominican 
Republic . . . . However, “[i]n the 1980s and early 1990s, conversion to organic agriculture by 
Dominican producers was relatively easy. Producers were typically practicing low-input, often de 
facto organic, farming prior to their entry into formal organic farming.”); accord World Markets 
for Organic Fruit and Vegetables-Opportunities for Developing Countries in the Production and 
Export of Organic Horticultural Products: Dominican Republic, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N. 
(2001) [hereinafter World Markets for Organic Fruit and Vegetables], http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/004/yl669e/yl669e0k.htm#bm20 (“Generally it is important to note that many of the small 
scale farmers were using few inputs prior to conversion to organic agriculture mainly for 
economic reasons. However, this also meant that the switch to organic production did not require 
a major shift in ingrained ‘bad habits’ such as overdependence on pesticides.”). 
 22.  Cuba vs. Dominican Republic, INDEX MUNDI,http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/ 
compare/cuba.dominican-republic (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Raynolds, supra note 21, at 161. 
 25.  Id. at 177 (As of 2002, Dominican organic export production involved “about 14,000 
producers, the vast majority of whom farmed fewer than three hectares of land.”). 
 26.  Id. at 168; see also World Markets for Organic Fruit and Vegetables, supra note 21. 
 27.  World Markets for Organic Fruit and Vegetables, supra note 21. 
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hundred.”28 They also vary in terms of sophistication. The National 
Confederation of Dominican Cacao Producers (CONACADO), for 
example, provides a wide range of services on behalf of farmers, 
including organization, technical support, loans, and marketing of 
products.29 CONACADO has even contributed to the development of 
organic regulations.30 Associations and cooperatives have been 
instrumental to achieving large-scale production through the sharing of 
information and resources.31 
The Dominican government influences and oversees its organic 
agriculture sector principally through its Ministry of Agriculture and 
Centre for Export Promotion (CEDOPEX).32 The government has 
demonstrated a deep commitment to developing and improving organic 
production nationally.33 Indeed, “government policies, along with the 
availability of cheap land and labor,” have “encouraged an influx in 
foreign as well as domestic investments in a wide range of new export 
crops.”34 
All Dominican exports of organic produce are certified in accordance 
with international standards.35 Although meeting the certification 
requirements is logistically difficult and very expensive, these 
certifications are essential, given that destination markets legally require 
them.36 Several agencies perform these certifications, the most prevalent 
of which is the Germany-based BCS ÖKOGarantie, which has 
“established a national office in the Dominican Republic with trained 
technical staff to facilitate activities.”37 Thus, BCS certifier need only 
visit from Europe once a month.38 Other certification companies active 
on the island include the following: “Demeter (Germany), FVO (United 
States), Imo Control (Germany, Switzerland), Suolo Italia (Italy), Skal 
(Netherlands), IBB (Brazil), QAI (United States).”39 
                                                                                                                     
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Raynolds, supra note 21, at 167. 
 35.  Id. at 175 (“For most Dominican producers, keeping the detailed farm records required 
for certification is difficult, given relatively low educational levels . . . . ‘Certification is hugely 
expensive: we have to hire local semiprofessionals to help keep the records as well as the organic 
certifier.’”). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  World Markets for Organic Fruit and Vegetables, supra note 21. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
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The main certified organic agricultural products exported from the 
Dominican Republic include cocoa and tropical fruits.40 Others include 
coffee, eggplant, peppers, and coconut oil, to name a few.41 Notably, 
certain semi-processed products, such as mango puree and concentrated 
juice may be some of the most lucrative among Dominican certified 
organic export products.42 
Most Dominican organic exports go to only a handful of countries. 
Somewhat surprising, given its location, organic goods are exported 
largely to Europe “as a result of that region’s dominance in the organic 
market and favorable trade policies.”43 Leading importers of Dominican 
organics have included the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United 
Kingdom.44 
Although the Dominican Republic’s organic export sector has not 
been uniformly successful,45 it is considered “an important segment” of 
its national economy.46 Indeed, statistics from around 2008, show the 
Dominican Republic as one of the largest organic producers in Latin 
America, with exports generating around 30 million U.S. dollars per 
year.47 At that time, organic products accounted “for more than 4 percent 
of all Dominican agro-export earnings, representing 0.5 percent of total 
export revenues and 0.1 percent of the national economy.”48 
 
III. CUBA’S REGULATORY STRENGTHS 
 
Cuba has at its disposal a number of key regulatory and organizational 
resources that may assist in an effort to build-out its certified organic 
export sector.49 They include: 
                                                                                                                     
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Raynolds, supra note 21, at 171. 
 42.  World Markets for Organic Fruit and Vegetables, supra note 21. 
 43.  Raynolds, supra note 21, at 172. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 176 (“Organic production in the Dominican Republic is substantially more 
expensive than conventional agriculture because of certification costs as well as higher labor 
expenses and lower yields. While organic prices have generally more than compensated for these 
costs over the past fifteen years, premiums are declining. Profit margins for all major Dominican 
organic exports are eroding. Rising competition has driven down organic banana and cocoa prices; 
organic coffee prices have recently failed to cover even local production costs (internal citations 
omitted). As one longtime exporter lamented, ‘the solid and dependable profits we once got for 
Dominican organic products have simply disappeared in the last few years.’ While profits have 
eroded for organic banana, cocoa, and coffee exports, this is less the case for the newer mango, 
lemon, and plantain exports.”). 
 46.  Id. at 168. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See discussion infra Section III(A-F). 
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 (A) Cuba’s Foreign Investment Law 118/2014; 
 (B) The Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED Mariel); 
 (C) Existing national organic standards; 
 (D) Available unutilized agricultural land; 
 (E) Farming organizations and evolving incentive structures 
(direct incentives, surplus incentives and land grant incentives); 
and 
 (F) Existing certified organic operations. 
These resources are described in detail in the following 
subsections. 
 
A. Cuban Foreign Investment Law 118/2014 
 
In 2014, Cuba enacted Foreign Investment Law 118/2014,50 which 
“[s]ets out the principal legal structures for the implementation of 
investment projects in Cuba including investment protection and the 
general rules relevant to foreign investors.”51 Law 118 is designed to 
address “Cuba’s need to provide greater incentives to attract foreign 
capital, new technologies, and know-how to increase domestic 
production and better position Cuba to export to international markets.”52 
In other words, Law 118 is designed to channel large foreign investments 
into government-approved sectors.53 
To that end, the law defines the legal and tax frameworks guiding 
foreign investments in Cuba.54 Law 118 is generally viewed as a “good 
start in laying the framework for well-planned projects viewed to be 
viable by both foreign investors and Cuban government.”55 However, it 
is unclear how appealing Cuban investment opportunities will be. 
Investors may be reluctant to enter Cuba given the country’s history of 
nationalization and potential for political instability. 
Nevertheless, Law 118 provides a key corridor for capital to enter 
Cuba. Without access to such capital, a certified organic large scale sector 
build-out is likely impossible at this time given Cuba’s current economic 
profile.56 
 
                                                                                                                     
 50.  See generally Foreign Investment Act (Law No. 118/2014) (Cuba). 
 51.  ZONA ESPECIAL DE DESARROLLO MARIEL, OPEN TO THE WORLD 47 (2014), http://kuba-
komora.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2ENZED-Mariel-Investor-Guide.pdf. 
 52.  Alcalde, supra note 10. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
9
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B. Mariel Special Development Zone 
 
Just prior to the enactment of Law 118, the Cuban government 
published Special Development of Mariel Decree Law 313/2013, which 
“[e]stablishe[ed] a special regime for investment . . . within the province 
of Artemisa,” adjacent to the existing municipality of Mariel.57 This 
“Mariel Special Development Zone” or “ZED Mariel,” encompasses 180 
square miles, partially covering six municipalities.58 ZED Mariel is 
designed as a major port operation, with access to the national rail system 
and a local airport.59 It is about twenty-eight miles west of Havana.60 
Further, Taxation Act 113/2012, which “[d]etails the general tax rules for 
all economic activities in Cuba, including for Cuban/non-Cuban nationals 
and Cuban/international companies,”61 grants certain key tax breaks and 
exemptions for qualifying foreign businesses so long as they operate 
within the ZED Mariel.62 
ZED Mariel could be a key resource in developing a certified organic 
sector in Cuba given the tax and logistical advantages. Notably, ZED 
Mariel provides for agricultural activities.63 Indeed, the initial 
development phase of ZED Mariel includes eleven zones, one of which 
is reserved for “agricultural development and processing.”64 
 
                                                                                                                     
 57.  ZONA ESPECIAL DE DESARROLLO MARIEL, supra note 51, at 47. 
 58.  Id. at 31. 
 59.  Common Questions, Answer to What Infrastructure Does the Zone Have?, 
ZEDMARIEL, http://www.zedmariel.com/pages/eng/Preguntas_Frec.php (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017) (“A modern container terminal is already being exploited with 702 metres of docks, having 
the capacity and services to handle Super-Post-Panamax vessel operations, with modern 
equipment having a high level of automation for container handling, warehousing, connections, 
and monitoring. The terminal is managed by PSA of Singapore, classified as one of the 
connections between the Zone and the Havana-Pinar del Rio Throughway and the Pan-American 
Highway. Construction is rapidly being carried out on railroad lines and on repairing and 
extending other existing rail lines, thereby permitting the Zone to connect with the national 
railway network in order to guarantee moving merchandise to any point in Cuba, as well as 
moving the work force from the capital. Conditions are in place to ensure that stable drinking 
water can be supplied to all investments that are being executed in the Zone. Power supply is 
ensured by a network of modern sub-stations, with three entry circuits that permit dealing with 
any contingencies that may occur due to meteorological reasons or unforeseen disruptions. The 
Zone has a communications system interconnected by fiber optics and backup radio linkup. In the 
future we foresee the installation of a communication center connected by fiber optics backing up 
its networks.”). 
 60.  General Information, ZEDMARIEL, http://www.zedmariel.com/pages/eng/Informaci 
on_General.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 61.  ZONA ESPECIAL DE DESARROLLO MARIEL, supra note 51, at 47. 
 62.  Id. at 48. 
 63.  Id. at 31. 
 64.  Id. 
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C. National Organics Standards 
 
Cuban organic products exported to major international markets must 
be certified in accordance with the respective international organics 
standards of the countries for which they are bound.65 Although meeting 
those certification requirements is logistically complicated and 
expensive, they are necessary because destination markets legally require 
them.66 
An important step for countries wishing to achieve countrywide 
organic certification is to develop national certification standards.67 
Adopting such standards allows producer countries to better monitor and 
control the quality of their products and signal a high level of 
sophistication to import markets.68 Indeed, if a country is able to 
demonstrate that its national organic standards are compliant with 
European Uniion standards and that its standards are effectively enforced 
for a certain period, it may be eligible for placement on the European 
Union Equivalence list of third-countries.69 Making the third country list 
may simplify the process of exporting to the European Union,70 reduce 
certification costs, and allow easy access to other countries who maintain 
equivalence agreements with the European Union.71 
After establishing a Technical Committee to discuss the possibility of 
                                                                                                                     
 65.  Raynolds, supra note 21, at 175 (“For most Dominican producers, keeping the detailed 
farm records required for certification is difficult, given relatively low educational levels. As a 
major organic exporter explains, ‘Certification is hugely expensive: we have to hire local 
semiprofessionals to help keep the records as well as the organic certifier.’”). 
 66.  Id. at 175. 
 67.  Sopia Twarog, Organic Agriculture: A Trade and Sustainable Development 
Opportunity for Developing Countries, in TRADE & ENVTL. REV. 2006, at 141, 172 (United 
Nations, 2006). There has been a lot of recent activity within Cuba to this end. Indeed, “Winrock 
volunteer and organic agriculture expert Charles Mitchell traveled to Cuba [in November of 2016] 
to participate in the country’s first ever National Conference in Organic Certification, where he 
shared his expertise as both an organic farmer and organic inspector in the United States and 
Canada.” Building on the initial Winrock-sponsored exchange in March, the Asociacion Cubana 
de Tecnicos Agricolas y Forestales (ACTAF) invited Mitchell to present at this historic event at 
the Ministry of Agriculture in Havana. Helping inform 40 participants from various governmental 
organizations—as well as farmers, processors, researchers, and students about the organic 
certification process—Mitchell outlined the general crop production standards of the U.S. 
National Organic Program (NOP), discussing inspector qualifications and the inspection process. 
Winrock Volunteer Shares Organic Farming, Certification Expertise in Cuba, WINROCK INT’L 
[hereinafter Winrock Volunteer], https:www.winrock.org/winrock-volunteer-shares-organic-
farming-certification-expertise-in-cuba/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 68.  Ulrich Hoffmann, Environmental Requirements and Market Access for Developing 
Countries: Promoting Environmental - Not Trade - Protection, in TRADE & ENVTL. REV. 2006, at 
1, 19 (United Nations, 2006). 
 69.  Twarog, supra note 67, at 213. 
 70.  Id. at 214. 
 71.  Id. at 213. 
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creating national organic standards, the Cuban National Standards Office 
decided that it would move forwards with a national standard modeled 
upon the EU standard.72 The resulting regulation is entitled Norma 
Cubana 500/2010, Guidelines for the Production and Processing, 
Labelling and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods73 and European 
Union (EU) Council Regulation (EC) NO 823/2007, On Organic 
Production and Labeling of Organic Products.74 However, it is unclear 
to what extent the Cuban government is promoting or enforcing its 
national standards. The Cuban standards may also be slightly outdated. 
Moare recently, efforts have been made in Cuba to promote the 
Sistema Participativo de Garantia (PAAC),75 which is “a local Cuban 
certification process, which is a separate but similar organic standard to 
other international standards established by the International Federation 
of Organic Agriculture Movements.”76 The Asociacion Cubana de 
Tecnicos Agricolas y Forestales (ACTAF)77 has been working in 
                                                                                                                     
 72.  Vossenaar & Angel, supra note 2, at 235. 
 73.  See generally Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, Guidelines for the Production, 
Processing, Labeling and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods, Doc. No. GL 32-1999 
(2013) [hereinafter Doc. No. GL 32-1999]; see also CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, 
ORGANICALLY PRODUCED FOODS iii (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ORGANICALLY PRODUCED FOODS] 
(stating “The Codex Alimentarius Commission is an intergovernmental body with over 170 
members, within the framework of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme established 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), with the purpose of protecting the health of consumers and ensuring fair 
practices in the food trade. The Commission also promotes coordination of all food standards 
work undertaken by international governmental and non governmental organizations . . . . The 
Guidelines are intended to facilitate the harmonization of requirements for organic products at the 
international level, and may also provide assistance to governments wishing to establish national 
regulations in this area. The Guidelines include general sections describing the organic production 
concept and the scope of the text; description and definitions; labelling and claims (including 
products in transition/conversion); rules of production and preparation, including criteria for the 
substances allowed in organic production; inspection and certification systems; and import 
control.”). 
 74.  See INT’L FED’N OF ORGANIC AGRIC. MOVEMENTS EU GRP., EUROPEAN ORGANIC 
REGULATIONS (EC) No 834/2007, 889/2008 AND 1235/2008: AN EVALUATION OF THE FIRST 
THREE YEARS LOOKING FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 6 (2012), http://www.ifoameu.org/sites/ 
default/files/page/files/ifoameu_reg_regulation_dossier_201204_en.pdf (stating “[1]ike its 
predecessor, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91, Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 set up 
primarily as an internal market and consumer protection regulation, describes the organic 
production standards and the control and labelling requirements.”). 
 75.  See generally Pedro Gavilanes Diaz, Participative System of Guarantee: A Viable 
Alternative for Organic Certification in the Context of Urban and Suburban Cuban Agriculture, 
2011 AGRICULTURA ORGANICA, no. 2, 2011, at 43. 
 76.  Winrock Volunteer, supra note 67 (stating “These standards are the basis for all the 
current country-based standards in the U.S., Canada, the European Union, along with other 
smaller country standards.”). 
 77.  Cuban Partners, Answer to Asociacion Cubana de Tecnicos y Forestales (ACTAF), 
HAVANDA CONSULTING, http://www.havanada.com/?page_id=17&lang=en (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017) (“Founded in 1987, ACTAF has branches in every province and some 100,000 affiliates, 
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conjunction with the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture “to bring more 
awareness of the benefits of the PAAC system, in order to expedite is 
approval.”78 However, these standards appear geared toward certification 
for products bound for only domestic markets.79 
While these existing certified organic standards have their limitations, 
they could nevertheless be a powerful resource insofar as they could form 
the regulatory backbone of a national certified organic sector build-out. 
This is true, especially because they appear largely compliant with 
European Union certified organic requirements. This is important not 
only because the European Union would probably be Cuba's major target 
market but also because European Union compliance is a potential 
gateway to other major international markets by way of both the 
European Union third country list and the equivalency agreements 
between certain major organic import countries. 
 
D. Available Land Fit for Agricultural Use 
 
Another resource potentially available to assist in the build-out of the 
Cuban certified organic export sector is Cuba’s reserves of unused arable 
land. This is true primarily for two, interrelated reasons. First, if Cuba 
decides to build-out its certified organic export sector now, it will 
probably need to balance related exports with existing internal food 
security concerns.80 Existing land reserves could play an important role 
in achieving this balance by allowing the country to add certified organic 
farms to its farming sector while at the same time maintaining current 
levels of internal production. In other words, tapping into Cuba’s surplus 
                                                                                                                     
one fourth of the country’s force of agricultural and forestry technicians. Since 1999 ACTAF 
contributes to the agricultural development of the country by promoting sustainable production 
techniques in harmony with the environment, both in rural as well as urban communities. Its first 
efforts were to encourage and extend organic agriculture, through the Organic Agriculture Group, 
which earned it the Alternative Nobel Prize ‘Right Livelihood’ in Sweden (1999). ACTAF is a 
member of IFOAM – International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, and the 
Caribbean representative before MAELA – Latin American Organic Agriculture Movement 
(Ascociación Cubana de Técnicos Agrícolas y Forestales, 2005). ACTAF had implemented 
dozens of projects with international cooperation partners throughout the country, in such areas 
as urban agriculture, agroecology, sound agricultural management, sustainable forestry, gender 
focus in the farm sector, and production of bamboo, beans, cocoa and medicinal plants. Its partners 
have included Oxfam America (US) and Canada, IDRC, LifeCycles Project and CARE.”). 
 78.  Winrock Volunteer, supra note 67. 
 79.  Id. (“[The advantage of PAAC] is that is simpler for small farmers to get into local 
markets, sell to tourists, and hotels . . . [It] could have the potential to open these markets for 
smaller producers, as well as give consumers some confidence that the product was actually 
produced with organic methods.”). 
 80.  See generally G.B. Hagelberg & Jose Alvarez, Cuban Agriculture: The Return of the 
Campesinado, 19 CUBA IN TRANSITION 229, 232 (2009). 
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farmland as part of a certified organic export build-out could help 
mitigate potential net losses of internal production. In other words, 
tapping into Cuba’s surplus farmland as part of a certified organic export 
build-out could help mitigate potential net losses of internal food 
production for domestic consumption. Second, excess farmable land 
could be used to incentivize both new and existing farmers to participate 
in certified organic exports through land grants.81 
The extent of the underutilization of Cuba’s agricultural potential was 
partially revealed by a survey of land use conducted by the Cuban 
National Office of Statistics at the end of 2007. That survey revealed that 
“since 2002, the area under cultivation in the country had shrunk by 
603,000 hectares, or 16.8%, while the area totally idle, i.e., not used even 
for pasture, had grown by 32.1% to some 1,230,000 hectares, constituting 
18.6% of all agricultural land.”82 In other words, the report shows a 
significant reduction in the use of arable lands or, conversely, a 
significant availability of lands suitable for farming in Cuba. Based on 
more recent statistics released by the Cuban government, it appears that 
little has changed in this regard.83 
 
E. Farming Incentives & Organizations 
 
Farming incentives would likely be an indispensable resource in any 
effort to build-out the Cuban certified organic export sector. These 
incentives would need to motivate Cuban farmers to convert to certified 
organic practices, convince existing farmers to increase their crop 
coverage area, convince farmers to farm new types of produce, or attract 
existing or new farmers to move to previously unfarmed land. Cuba 
maintains a set of farming incentives which may be adaptable to potential 
certified organic incentives. These existing incentives can be roughly 
divided into three categories: direct, surplus, and land grants. Each is 
discussed in the subsections below. 
However, before exploring individual incentives, it is important to 
understand the ever-shifting context within which the incentives function. 
This requires a look at how the Cuban government interacts with and 
                                                                                                                     
 81.  See id. at 236. 
 82.  Id. at 230 (stating “These numbers put into perspective the government’s programs of 
urban market gardens and to encourage the cultivation of vacant plots elsewhere, which have 
received much attention also outside Cuba.”). 
 83.  NAT’L OFF. OF STATS. & INFO., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF CUBA 2014, at 228 fig.9.2 
(2015), http://www.one.cu/aec2014/00%Anvario%20Estadistico%202014.pdf (describing “Land 
distribution according to its use per province on June 2014” in figure 9.2, which shows 6,278.9 
miles de hectáreas of agricultural land in Cuba with only 2,668.7 of those miles de hectáreas under 
cultivation). 
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exerts control over farmers, as well as the ways in which farmers are 
allowed by the government to organize themselves. Indeed, farmer 
organizations are themselves an additional key resource available to a 
certified organic sector build-out. A certified organic sector build-out 
would require mobilizing potentially thousands of farmers to change 
methods, move, or expand operations. From a purely practical 
perspective, it would be very difficult to mobilize such farmers without a 
means to communicate with farmers. Farmer cooperatives, along with the 
National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de 
Agricultores Pequeños, or ANAP), which represents them, may provide 
such a hub for communications. 
Following the 1959 Revolution, the Cuban government and most 
Cuban farmers were once one-and-the-same from an enterprise 
perspective.84 That homogeneity, however, began to disappear in the 
early 1990s following the loss of Soviet economic support and 
subsidization to Cuba resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.85 As the “Special Period” began, the Cuban government began to 
dismantle its immense state farms, breaking them up into smaller “Basic 
Units of Cooperative Production” (Unidades Basicas de Produccion 
Cooperativa or UBPCs).86 The development and framework of UBPCs 
were described by one expert as follows: 
 
Former state farm workers were given the option of becoming 
members of the new UBPCs. Members of the cooperative elect 
their leaders (referred to as a “Direction Board”) from among their 
membership. The board of each UBPC is composed of nine 
members: the manager; the chiefs of economics, production, 
services, machinery, and land; the principal engineer; and two 
other UBPC members. Members also have the right to vote on the 
admission of new members and the termination of members who 
may not be performing their duties adequately.87 
 
Only one year after the UBPC model was initiated, about half of the 
area formerly in state hands had moved to UBPCs along with their 
approximately 257,000 members.88 This represented a dramatic shift in 
land shares from the state to the non-state sector.89 It also resulted in a 
slightly expanded degree of farmer autonomy not previously available on 
                                                                                                                     
 84.  Hagelberg & Alvarez, supra note 80, at 229. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  JOSÉ ALVAREZ, CUBA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 77 (John M. Kirk ed., 2004). 
 88.  Id. at 76. 
 89.  Id. 
15
Hevia et al.: Seizing the “Organic” Moment
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
318 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29 
 
state farms during the current governmental regime. These trends of 
increased land transfer from state to non-state sectors have continued over 
the past twenty years.90 
The UBPCs are somewhat similar in form and function to other types 
of agricultural production cooperatives in existence in post-
Revolutionary Cuba, including Agricultural Production Cooperatives 
(Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria or CPAs) and Cooperatives 
of Credit and Service (Cooperativas de Crédito y Servicios or CCSs). 
Indeed, according to official Cuban statistics, the state sector is comprised 
only of State Farms and Enterprises and individual farms managed by 
various state entities, whereas the non-state sector includes UBPCs, 
CPAs, CCSs, and “dispersed farmers.”91 According to recent data 
released by the Cuban government, 4,336,300 hectares of agricultural 
land are in the non-state sector, while only 1,942,600 hectares of 
agricultural land remain in the state sector.92 
While the various non-state farming entities differ from one another 
in interesting and important ways,93 those intricacies are largely beyond 
the scope of this paper. Rather, here, it is only important to emphasize 
that these entities, along with ANAP, are the gateway to communicating 
with farmers for the purpose of establishing and effectuating successful 
farming initiatives, and are thus, a key resource available to promote the 
build-out of a certified organic export sector. 
                                                                                                                     
 90.  See id. at 75-89. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  NAT’L OFFICE OF STATISTICS & INFO., supra note 83, at 228. 
 93.  See Hagelberg & Alvarez, supra note 80, at 230 n.3 (indicating, for example, that 
various non-state farming entities can differ in bargaining power, possession of farming 
machinery, historical significance, and form of land tenure. Also, “[w]here to locate the UBPCs 
on the public-private sector spectrum is open to debate. Cf. Pollitt (1997): ‘part worker 
cooperatives, part collective farms . . . on lands leased in perpetuity from the state . . . . largely 
modeled on the Agricultural Production Cooperatives (Cooperativas de Producción 
Agropecuaria, or CPAs) that had been fostered among private farms since 1977’; Burchardt 
(2000): ‘a dual entity halfway between the state enterprise and the true cooperative’; Enríquez 
(2000): ‘an intermediate form of organization located somewhere between state farm granjas 
[state enterprise units] and CPAs’; Espinosa Burquet (2004): ‘a new type of [semi-autonomous] 
state cooperatives’; Molina Díaz (2007): ‘semi-private cooperatives’; Roman (2004) cited 
Orlando Lugo Fonte, president of the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), to the 
effect that since their land was state-owned, UBPCs were not considered to be agricultural 
cooperatives, did not belong to ANAP, and were not covered by the laws regulating agricultural 
cooperatives. However, Cuban statistics assign the UBPCs to the ‘non-state sector,’ together with 
CPAs (officially defined as ‘a collective form of social ownership’ of the land and other basic 
means of production), credit and service cooperatives (Cooperativas de Créditos y Servicios, or 
CCSs, in which ‘ownership of each farm, its equipment and the resulting production remain 
private’), scattered private farmers, and domestic plots. The problems of UBPC governance and 
management, particularly of the units primarily growing sugarcane, were discussed and 
extensively referenced in Hagelberg and Alvarez (2006).”). 
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1. Direct Incentives 
 
One of the primary government incentives available to Cuban farmers 
today is what may be referred to as a direct incentive.94 The primary direct 
incentive utilized in Cuban agriculture is monetary: namely, the amount 
of money the Cuban government pays farmers for their contractually 
mandated production quotas.95 In some instances, however, the prices the 
government pays farmers for their quota production are not sufficient to 
cover the farmers’ costs of production.96 In recognition of this, the Cuban 
government has been attempting to increase the prices it offers to 
growers.97 A 2012 report claims that “[i]nterviews conducted with 
farmers and officials beginning in 2008 have indicated that prices paid to 
producers for . . . milk and plantains [have] tripled, and the prices of 
potatoes, sweet potatoes, and black beans have doubled.”98 “However, 
the prices paid for milk and rice . . . [were only] about one-third [of] 
Cuba’s cost of importing those products[.]”99 To the extent that the same 
is true of other agricultural products, there appears to be “more room to 
raise producer prices [as direct] incentives in the interest of reducing 
import costs.”100 
Other direct incentives include the physical resources needed to farm 
effectively in Cuba. For example, farming inputs are potentially, one type 
of nonmonetary direct farming incentive.101 Indeed, limited access to 
agricultural inputs has been a major problem for Cuban farmers since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.102 Even recycled and locally sourced inputs 
are in limited supply.103 Therefore, direct farming incentives may include 
improved access to domestically-produced and imported fertilizers as 
well as compost production from local raw materials including coffee 
pulp, manure, and sugarcane bagasse.104 Similarly, cover crops “are an 
                                                                                                                     
 94.  See, e.g., PHILIP PETERS, LEXINGTON INST., REFORMING CUBAN AGRICULTURE: 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS 3 (2012), https://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonCuban 
Agriculture-1-2.pdf. 
 95.  See id. 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Lukas Kilcher, Organic Agriculture in Cuba: Managing with Limited Resources, in 
THE WORLD OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE - STATISTICS AND EMERGING TRENDS 2009, at 198, 201 
(Willer, Helga, & Lukas Kilcher eds., 2009). 
 102.  See id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
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excellent solution for improving soil fertility, adding additional nutrients 
to the soil while contributing to the management of weeds.”105 But seeds 
and propogation materials for cover crops as well as for regular crop 
production are often unavailable or only available in limited supplies.106 
Machinery is another example of a potential non-monetary direct 
farming incentive.107 Labor can be scarce, especially at larger Cuban 
farms.108 In such cases, machinery can be particularly important to 
improve production and productivity to achieve cultivation, compost 
production, and compost application.109 However, in some cases “these 
tools are not available, and in other cases, the [farming] cooperatives 
cannot afford them.”110 
 
2. Surplus Incentives 
 
Another one of the primary government incentives available to Cuban 
farmers today is what be referred to as a “surplus incentive.” That form 
of incentive has been described as follows: 
 
With the opening of the agricultural markets . . . UBPCs [and, 
indeed, all agricultural producers] were provided with important 
production incentives. Once the production goals are agreed upon 
between the state enterprise and a UBPC Direction Board, the 
UBPC quota for sale to [the state collection and distribution 
agency] is set at 80 percent of the overall production goals. 
This quota is broken up into monthly commitment levels. The 
UBPC is free to sell the remaining 20 percent of the production 
goal and 20 percent of any excess above the production goal in the 
agricultural markets.111 
 
The “surplus incentive” is a form of option agreement between the 
government and farmers. The farmers receive the right but not the 
obligation to produce a limited amount over the mandated base 
production quota. If the farmers choose to exercise their option to produce 
in excess of their mandated quota, they can then sell that excess at local 
markets at free market prices which are considerably higher than the 
                                                                                                                     
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  ALVAREZ, supra note 87, at 78.  
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prices paid by the government for quota production volumes.112  
These “surplus incentives” are extremely important because “in 
addition to being the source of funds that the UBPC uses to pay off its 
equipment and other loans, [they are also] the source of incentive 
compensation to the individual workers.”113 Depending on the type of 
crops produced and the mix of crops within a particular UBPC, elaborate 
systems of recordkeeping and control have been implemented in order to 
maintain fairness in distribution of payments to individual member 
farmers.114  
Many Cuban farmers are authorized to sell a wide range of products 
directly to the tourism sector, “without the mediation of a state 
enterprise.”115 This allows farmers with high-quality products to 
negotiate appealing purchase pricing with large, domestic buyers with the 
financial ability to pay higher prices, including hotels. Cuba has also 
experimented with wholesale farmer’s markets.116 However, these 
experimental markets have been limited,117 and many complain that 
farming is still in “agony,” as “[w]holesale markets have not yet 
materialized, making it hard for farmers to keep up with rising demand 
from the new middle class and private sector restaurants.”118  
The surplus incentive becomes even more important to farmers as 
restrictions on wholesale and direct internal sales continue to loosen 
because, in theory, the price paid to farmers for their products outside of 
the government quota system reflects true market demand, and is thus 
higher. Furthermore, agricultural products of premium quality could 
receive an even higher price. It appears that Cuba is making some strides 
toward freeing up more private enterprise in this regard.119  
                                                                                                                     
 112.  Id. at 79 (stating “[t]he UBPCs have some degree of autonomy within this system. For 
example, they are free to sell surplus production in any agricultural market they choose. It 
obviously costs less to transport their crops to local markets, but prices in these markets are 
typically lower than the prices prevailing in the markets in the city of Havana . . . The government 
charges a lower tax rate on crops sold in agricultural markets in the cities than at rural markets to 
encourage shipment of food into the cities. Leaders of the UBPCs understand these tradeoffs and 
carefully assess the relative costs and benefits when deciding where to market their surplus.”).  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Cuban Farmers Will Be Able to Sell Their Products Direct to Tourism Facilities, ON 
CUBA (Sept. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Cuban Farmers], http://oncubamagazine.com/latest/cuban 
farmers-will-be-able-to-sell-their-products-direct-to-tourism-facilities/. 
 116.  See Marc Frank, Cuba Experiments with Wholesale Market for Farmers, REUTERS 
(June 1, 2014, 1:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-reform-agricultureidUSK 
BN0EC1NW20140601. 
 117.  See id.  
 118.  Marc Frank, Cuban Farmers in “Agony” Waiting for Promised Reforms, REUTERS 
(Apr. 14, 2016, 11:06 AM) [hereinafter Frank, Cuban Farmers in “Agony”], 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-congress-reforms-idUSKCN0XB16Z.  
 119.  PETERS, supra note 94, at 5 (stating “The union of Cuba’s private farmers and CCS 
cooperative members, ANAP (Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos) would prefer 
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3. Land Grant Incentives  
 
Another important incentive available to Cuban farmers are land 
grants. On July 10, 2008, Cuba’s Council of State created Decree-Law 
No. 259, which set out “the terms for the transfer in usufruct of idle lands 
to individuals and corporate bodies.”120 Decree-Law No. 259 was enacted 
because, as its whereas clause states, “[there exists] a considerable 
percentage of idle state lands which makes it necessary to grant lands in 
usufruct to individuals and corporate bodies in order to increase the 
production of food and reduce its importation.”121 Thus, the decree 
allowed landless individuals to “obtain up to 13.42 hectares and existing 
landholders could bring their total area up to 40.26 hectares under licenses 
valid for up to 10 years and successively renewable for the same 
period.”122 Existing farming entities were allowed to “apply for the 
usufruct of an unlimited area for 25 years, renewable for another 25 
years.”123  
Decree-Law No. 259’s land grants come with a string of conditions. 
These include limitations on transferability of the usufruct right, exposure 
to special taxes, requirements to join local cooperatives, and, more 
nebulously, potential revocation “for reasons of public utility or social 
interest.”124 Indeed, grantees are subject to product delivery contracts that 
require them “to abide by a moral and social conduct in accordance with 
the ethical principles of our society.”125 Despite these conditions, close to 
one hundred thousand applications were received after only a few months 
of program operation.126 Indeed, the program appears to have achieved 
                                                                                                                     
substantial change. About 30 percent of these producers’ output goes to farmers markets, where 
prices move according to supply and demand, and the rest is contracted by the state. In May 2010 
ANAP called for several changes: expanding direct sales to consumer outlets, allowing 
cooperatives to contract directly with state enterprises, and allowing cooperatives to sell directly 
to hotels and restaurants in the tourism sector. ANAP’s president at the time, Orlando Lugo, 
advocated allowing all producers to sell directly to the market without any state intermediary. ‘I 
think that sales have to be broken up a lot,’ he said in an interview during ANAP’s annual meeting. 
‘If in Cuba there is private and diversified production, one cannot have monopolized sales. We 
have to seek many forms of purchase and sale. If I were asked, I would say it has to be direct. If 
a cooperative wants to sell products and have a point of sale, let it have one. If a hotel wants to 
buy a product from a cooperative, why can’t it do so? Why does it have to be through an 
enterprise? We have to continue insisting on direct sales by producers to the retail network. There 
are provinces that have some experiences. I know that it is being studied, but it is true, this is 
something that is still not resolved.’”). 
 120.  Hagelberg & Alvarez, supra note 80, at 230.  
 121.  Id. at 236. 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. at 230.  
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the level of interest it set out to achieve.127 However, ultimate long-term 
success of the program is yet to be determined.128  
The program has also drawn some criticism for failing to properly 
support its farmers. Namely, there have been complaints about lack of 
tools, machinery, fuel, financial support, technical training, and 
unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles.129 The program has also had 
potentially important social and political impacts.130 For one, the program 
has led to a population resurgence in the Cuban rural sector.131 Secondly, 
the program has reinforced the notion that individual farmers can be 
effective contributors to solving large national problems. Indeed, one 
scholar calls the program yet another representation of “the abandonment 
of the long-held doctrine of the superiority of large-scale state or 
parastatal farming, of which Fidel Castro had been the foremost exponent 
in Cuba.”132 The program seems to be another indicator of the growing 
organizational divide between the Cuban government and the Cuban 
farming sector. Similarly, it seems to be another obvious indicator of the 
Cuban government’s increased willingness to relinquish some control of 
state-held lands for farming purposes. 
While Decree-Law No. 259 deals exclusively with usufruct land 
grants, one can imagine the possibility of future Cuban land grant 
incentives offering more extensive forms of land tenure. Indeed, many 
Cuban farmers currently hold land interests that go beyond mere usufruct 
rights. For example, “[m]embers of CPAs are the owners of their land 
while UBPCs lease state lands for an indefinite period of time.”133 
Further, in CCSs, individual cooperative members actually hold title to 
their specific piece of land and, in some instances, associated equipment.  
 
F. Existing Certified Organic Operations 
 
Certified organic farming has occurred in Cuba, albeit at relatively 
small scale and with largely undocumented results. These efforts may 
have arisen, in part, out of the Ministry of Agriculture’s “Organic 
Production Strategy” policy, which dates back to 2003.134 Information on 
these operations is generally limited. Nevertheless, their example can 
provide helpful logistical, biological, and economic lessons that could 
                                                                                                                     
 127.  Id. at 238.  
 128.  Id. at 239.  
 129.  Id. at 238.  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at 231.  
 133.  ALVAREZ, supra note 87, at 80.  
 134.  MAY LING CHAN & EDUARDO FRANCISCO FREYRE ROACH, UNFINISHED PUZZLE:  
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inform the build-out of Cuba’s certified organic sector today.  
Cuban certified organic export products have included coffee, cacao, 
honey, citrus, and sugar.135 Of those, fruit juice products destined for 
European markets and honey appear to have made the most headway.136 
One study found that these “exports of Cuban organic fruit juice are 
profitable despite high certification costs.”137 In the case of at least some 
of these products, many Cuban stakeholders—from state farms to small 
cooperatives—were involved in production.138 Certification was largely 
handled by the German company BCS ÖKOGarantie and the Swiss 
company bio.inspecta, with local routine inspections conducted by a by a 
Cuban research institute.139  
One researcher suggests that in 2001, 8,495 hectares of Cuban land 
were planted with certified organic crops, representing 0.12 percent of 
Cuba’s total agricultural area. That same researcher also suggests that the 
figure rose to 15,443 hectares by 2007.140 Another researcher claims that 
“[b]y the end of 2008, there were 2,954 certified organic farms in 
Cuba.”141 However, it is unclear to what standard those farms were 
certified.  
 
IV. POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
There are a number of potential constraints that could hamper the 
build-out of Cuba’s certified organic export sector. Inherent to almost all 
of these constraints is the problem of cost and the associated challenge of 
attracting foreign capital, which is of critical importance in providing the 
requisite investment for any build-out. Also, there are issues with making 
sure that prices offered to farmers cover costs, as well as organizing, 
educating, and incentivizing farmers to convert to certified organic 
farming methods. Beyond these financial and organizational challenges, 
there are other considerations as well.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Vossenaar & Angel, supra note 2, at 232 (“Cuba has been successful in increasing its 
exports of organic citrus fruit juices to the Swiss market; their value was amounted to around $1 
million in 2004.”); see also Chris Arsenault, Cuba’s Organic Honey Exports Create Buzz as Bees 
Die Off Elsewhere, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2016, 8:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-
farming-honey-idUSKCN0VI172.  
 137.  Vossenaar & Angel, supra note 2, at 230. 
 138.  Id. at 228. 
 139.  CHAN & ROACH, supra note 134, at § 2.7.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Kilcher, supra note 101, at 199.  
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A. Balancing Food Security with Exportation 
 
Any proposal to build-out Cuba’s certified organic export sector 
presumably must be structured so that it will not cause a large net decrease 
of domestic food production meant for internal consumption, and 
therefore, significantly worsen Cuba’s food security status.142 Under such 
a program, it is conceivable that Cuba could actually increase its domestic 
food production meant for internal consumption by reinvesting the capital 
it gains from export sales into its agricultural sector, thereby, improving 
its food security status. However, the actual Cuban economic dynamic 
that might follow a certified organic sector build-out is unknown. Before 
committing to a certified organic export sector build-out, Cuba should 
assess the potential economic consequences with food security in mind, 
and balance risks with potential rewards.  
 
B. Biological Feasibility 
 
Biological feasibility is a potential roadblock to any agricultural 
operation but especially so when dealing with heightened organic 
certification requirements and fickle international market consumers 
obsessed with certain aesthetic crop characteristics. It is thus key for Cuba 
to determine, before investing in a certified organic sector build-out, 
whether their soils are healthy enough to produce high quality crops, and 
whether prior or current farming practices have left legacy pollutants that 
could compromise organic certification potential.  
 
C. Environmental Risks 
 
1. Hurricanes  
 
Hurricanes have been a constant threat to Cuba’s development.143 
Indeed, “several disastrous storms caused the loss of complete harvests 
and destroyed plantations, as well as packing and processing facilities.”144 
While hurricanes are, of course, outside of Cuba’s control, they are 
important to consider in terms of a build-out of Cuba’s certified organic 
export sector insofar as they threaten to undermine the stability of that 
sector.  
2. Pests & Disease  
 
Pests and disease can be an impediment to any agricultural operation. 
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But they are especially threatening to organic farming operations due to 
the inherent lack of pesticides used in organic farming practices. Cuba 
has experienced a recent surge in new pests and diseases.145 Indeed, the 
Coffee Berry Borer has caused recent problems, and Citrus Greening 
(Huanglongbing, or HLB) threatens the very future of Cuba’s citrus 
industry.146 A shift to certified organic practices may expose growers to 
new threats, so Cuba should assess these risks prior to investing in a 
certified organic sector build-out.  
 
3. Quality Control  
 
Many international certified organic markets will import only the best 
looking products.147 These high aesthetic standards are in addition to 
organic certification requirements.148 Indeed, the Dominican Republic’s 
example reveals situations in which crop aesthetics became a problem.149 
It appears that smaller groups of farmers were most susceptible to 
wavering product consistency.150 It is therefore imperative that any 
certified organic exporter maintain the quality and the consistency of 
production. Controls should thus be implemented to maintain these 
standards throughout the production, post-harvest, and transportation 
processes.  
 
V. CRAFTING A CUBAN CERTIFIED ORGANIC PILOT PROGRAM 
 
Cuba appears to have many of the resources necessary to support a 
buildout of its certified organic export sector—that is, with one glaring 
exception: capital.151 In order to fill the financing gap, Cuba will need to 
                                                                                                                     
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id.  
 148.  See id.  
 149.  Raynolds, supra note 21, at 176 (“While quality criteria for organic produce were 
historically relatively low, supermarkets now require that organic and conventional fruits and 
vegetables meet essentially the same standards. Most Dominican organic bananas are sold in the 
United Kingdom, the country with the tightest supermarket regulations. Exporters in the 
Dominican Republic report that they cannot sell bananas of the quality shipped just a few years 
ago because buyers require that organic bananas look like conventional bananas; in other words, 
they must be of a uniform specified size, color, shape, and blemish-free appearance.”). 
 150.  Id. at 181 (“[C]ertified organic food exports are becoming more ‘buyer driven,’ as the 
commodity chain literature would suggest. Current market trends are increasing the power of 
buyers and are working to displace or disempower small organic producers. Yet if we look beyond 
the realm of economic firms, we find that strong producer associations and transnational 
movement ties have countered these trends with some success in the Dominican Republic.”). 
 151.  See Cuba: Current Issues and What the World Food Programme is Doing, supra note 
6; see also Altieri & Funes-Monzote, supra note 6, at 23-24; Foreign Investment Act (Law No. 
118/2014) (Cuba); Alcalde, supra note 10. 
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attract foreign investors.152 Therefore, if Cuba wishes to pursue a sector 
build-out, it will likely need to demonstrate to foreign investors that it is 
capable of being host to a certified organic regime. This could potentially 
be accomplished through the development of a pilot program for certified 
organic production, or via demonstration through its existing certified 
organic programs. Some of the issues that would be important in Cuba 
proving its capability to host expanded certified organic production are 




The primary objectives of a Cuban certified organic pilot program 
might include: (1) demonstrating that Cuba is capable of organizing and 
incentivizing a group of nationally representative farmers to successfully 
produce marketable organic products, at scale, and in concurrence with 
international certification standards; (2) developing institutional 
certified organic farming training and support systems that can be scaled 
up over time; (3) exploring and addressing the various concerns facing 
certified organic production, including cost, biological feasibility, and 
quality control; and (4) developing a sector base that can eventually be 




While many areas of Cuba have excellent soil fertility, few have the 
potential for efficient access to international markets. Indeed, that would 
require connection to internal distribution networks and good proximity 
to international ports. Assuming only these factors, one obvious site for a 
Cuban pilot program is the province of Artemisa.  
Artemisa is sometimes referred to as “Villa Roja (Red Town) or the 
Jardin de Cuba (garden of Cuba) for the famous fertility of its [red] soil, 
which still yields a rich annual harvest of sugarcane, tobacco and 
bananas.”153 Further, the Mariel Special Development Zone is within 
Artemisa.154 Thus, Artemisa falls within proximity of extensive internal 
distribution infrastructure and Cuba’s largest and most important 
international shipping port.155 Indeed, the Special Development Zone has 
reserved land specifically for agriculturally related facilities and 
operations.156  
                                                                                                                     
 152.  See generally MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE & INV., supra note 11; Timeline U.S. – 
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It appears that Artemisa also has a significant amount of unused or 
idle farmland that could potentially be used to facilitate a pilot program. 
Of Artemisa’s 244.2 thousand hectares of agricultural land, only 112.3 
thousand are cultivated.157 That leaves 131.9 thousand uncultivated, of 




Farmers would obviously be a key participant in a pilot program. 
Artemisa provides a well-balanced mix of farmer profiles.159 But these 
farmers would need guidance and technical assistance in order to convert 
to, and maintain, certified organic farming practices. Therefore, Cuban 
organic farming proponents such as the Cuban Association of 
Agricultural and Forestry Technicians (Asociación Cubana de Técnicos 
Agricolas y Forestales, or ACTAF),160 or the equivalent thereof, would 
likely be another necessary component of any pilot project.  
A final major participant in any pilot program would be the Cuban 
government. Indeed, the government would ultimately be responsible for 
the success of any pilot program, as they control the vast majority of 




Because there are significant hard costs, opportunity costs, and risks 
associated with participating in a pilot program, the government also will 
need to properly incentivize and support farmers throughout the program. 
This should include assurances that if yields are lower than expected, the 
government will nevertheless continue to financially support the farmer 
for the duration of the program. The government will need to work with 
farmer representatives to determine what combination of incentives is 




Initial efforts might be best targeted toward producing tropical fruits, 
such as mangoes. Tropical fruit products have seen biological and 
economic success in the neighboring Dominican Republic and should 
thus be adaptable to Cuba. Further, tropical fruits can be converted to 
tropical fruit products, such as juice and puree, which can be even more 
                                                                                                                     
 157.  NAT’L OFF. OF STATS & INFO., supra note 83, at 11.  
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 160.  See Cuban Partners, supra note 77.  
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While Cuba does have its own internal certification standards to work 
from,163 any pilot program should ultimately receive certification from an 
internationally recognized certification agency as Cuba has already done 




The international demand for certified organics appears capable of 
absorbing Cuba’s market entrance. Indeed, these already massive markets 
are trending toward continued expansion having nearly doubled in size 
from $57.5 billion in 2010 to $104.7 billion in 2015.164 Many products, 
including fruits and vegetables, are in demand.165  
Certification of organic food products for the export market is a 
complex, extensive, technical, and administrative process that requires 
adherence to rigorous farming methods, extensive monitoring, and, at 
least initially, a third party stamp of approval. Furthermore, many 
consumers of organic products will not simply avoid the purchase of 
products that are not consistently aesthetically pleasing. These high 
aesthetic standards must be met above and beyond the certification 
status—and this can be especially difficult for organic products. 
Nevertheless, the benefits, can be demonstrable. 
As mentioned previously in this paper, Cuban certified organic export 
products are reported to include citrus products, coffee, cacao, honey, and 
sugar.166 Thus, Cuba is familiar with the rigors of international organic 
certification processes, the challenges associated with maintaining 
organic status and the aesthetic requirements to meet consumer demands 
and expectations. 
While the European markets alone can probably support Cuba’s 
certified organic export potential, the United States represents a major 
additional market opportunity for Cuban certified organic products if and 
when the embargo is lifted.167 Establishing a certified organic export 
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sector now will position Cuba to respond to the rapidly growing 
American market for organic products once the opportunity becomes 
available. 
If Cuba is able to attract foreign capital and ultimately create a 
certified organic export sector, it would be in effect, committing to long-
term environmentally sustainable farming practices while bringing 
capital into its agricultural sector. If planned correctly, that capital could 
be reinvested to incentivize a net increase in internal agricultural 
production. This would be a favorable result for Cuba’s economy, its food 
security and environmental future, and the individual lives of Cuban 
farmers, alike.  
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